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field, and the necessity of demonstrative proof by the use of photo
graphs, etc., is much the same as in handwriting identification. The
admissability of such testimony and evidence in Michigan is estab
lished by the case of Bartholomew v. Walsh, 191 Mich. 252, which
also admits testimony as to characteristics of punctuation and capital
ization found in the questioned document, and as to the watermark
of the paper on which it was written. See also 17 Cyc. 189; People
v. Risley, 214 N. Y. 75.
There naturally will be no appeal in the present case, which is
unfortunate, since it will not be in the books as a precedent tending
to counteract the older critical decisions on this special subject. The
history of the case in this Journal, will, however, serve to show that
investigations of this sort are not of the hopeless character that they
were under the old procedure in Michigan.
John Thomas Dasef.
CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE JUDICIARY AND THE
POLICE
By John Barker Wa1te*
The problem in which I have been interested is the reason for
the great disproportion between the number of arrests by the police
and the number of convictions resulting. I have not solved the
problem, of course, but I think I have learned part of the reason.
Thanks to the courtesy of various police heads I have been enabled
to watch the police in their work and to observe many cases from
beginning to end. In this way I have seen the same case from the
point of view of both the police and the courts. I have been able also
to gain some insight into the probabilities of other cases whose facts
I have not actually observed.
I learned in the first place, that arrests which fail to result in
conviction are much the most numerous in respect to minor crimes.
Of course, many arrests for the more serious felonies do not result
in conviction, but, as one would naturally expect, abortive arrests are
of much higher proportion for misdemeanors and minor felonies. By
far the most numerous unprosecuted or unsuccessfully prosecuted
*Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Paper read by Mr. Waite
at the 1924 meeting of the Michigan State Bar Association.
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arrests are those made by the "vice-squads", "clean-up squads", or
"special divisions" as they are called in different cities. And there is
a legitimate explanation for it. Those squade have a most difficult
and thankless job. They are almost sure to be damned if they do
arrest, on the charge that they are exceeding their authority, and
absolutely certain to be damned if they don't arrest, on the charge
of failure to keep the city clean ; and in either case, they are usually
damned by the same people. The truth is that like the Israelites, they
are expected to make bricks without straw.
For instance, I am credibly informed through sources other than
the police themselves, that some very influential corporations in
Detroit, located in the red-light district, are urging the police to put
a stop to "window-tapping" by prostitutes. These concerns are not
merely urging the police to stop it; they are doing all they can to
compel the police to act. You may have noticed that every once in
a while some Detroit paper comes out with a tirade against the police
force, because, as it says, "window-tappers" are tap, tap, tapping all
up and down the streets, to the great scandal of the city's morals.
The police, therefore, are forced by public opinion to stop window-
tapping in some way. They arrest tappers not because they like to be
officious, but because the public demands that such arrests be made.
But the truth is, that nobody knows whether or not window-
tapping is a crime.
The point first came to my notice, in the case of one Betty Harris,
arrested on a charge of window-tapping. She was convicted before
Judge Cotter who decided that window-tapping is a form of breach
of peace and constitutes a crime.
Miss Betty had money enough to "take an appeal" and in due
course, appeared before Judge Jeffries. I will read you the news
paper report of Judge Jeffries' ruling:
" 'Do you remember when you were a little boy?', Judge
Jeffries asked the policeman. 'Yes', said the witness. 'Did
your mother ever tap on the window to inform you it was
time for you to come in the house for supper ?'
,
Judge Jeffries
pursued. 'Yes', said the witness dubiously. 'You wouldn't
say she was disturbing the peace, would you?', asked the
court. 'Well no, not exactly', the witness replied. 'Well,
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then', said the court, 'neither was this woman disturbing the
peace. The case is dismissed'."
"There was a hum of assent from the underworld audience", the
report continues, ''as they filed out to Judge Bartlett's court."
The effect of the whole thing is thus given in the Free Press
of March 25th, commenting on the case before Judge Bartlett.
" 'Tapper' Free, Underworld Cheers Jurors—Riotous
Scene Greets Finding in Test Case before Judge Bartlett. —
Officers Summoned to eject Disturbers.
"Painted, bedizened women of Detrdit's underworld, led
by their so-called vice 'Queen,' Hattie Miller, late Monday
turned Judge Charles Bartlett's court room into bedlam with
wild cheers and shouts. A jury had just found a verdict that
upsets the police crusade against window-tapping to attract
persons passing disorderly houses. It was the second blow
dealt the crusade Monday. The first set-back was delivered
by Judge Edward J. Jeffries.
"Attaches of Judge Bartlett's court tried in vain to quell
the uprising cheers, the while the judge pounded his desk
fiercely in an attempt to be heard over the clamorous rejoicing.
Finally the courtroom was cleared, the underworld charac
ters being literally pushed out into the corridors by police
men and court attaches."
As a result of all this, the concerns that want to put a stop to
window-tapping, in the interest of decency, are still wanting to do so,
and are still exerting what pressure they legitimately can. Every
once in a while you may read a news story about window-tapping
which directly or indirectly damns the police for not putting a stop
to it. And yet when the police do try to hold it in check by arrests,
they cannot convict the tappers, before Judge Jeffries at any rate.
So they make arrests of tappers in order to stop the tapping, as the
public demands ; and then they are forced by the judicial ruling to
discharge the women, whereupon the papers and emotionalists damn
the police for making unjustifiable arrests.
Hence, I say, the police get unmerited abuse, whether coming or
going, from those who consider only half the facts.
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I speak of this particularly, not at all because I hold a brief for
the police, and not because the judicial ruling was necessarily wrong,
but because pretended police oppression and illegality of action is
often used as an alleged justification for judicial refusal to co-operate
with the police. There are, of course, faults in the police activity,
but the point is, that much of the apparent wrong-doing by the police
is really honest and faithful effort to accomplish what the public
demands of them.
The fact that very many arrests are made without successful
prosecution of the persons arrested, is sometimes proof of judicial
refusal to act, rather than of over activity by the police; and even
when the inability to prosecute successfully is due altogether to un
lawful police activity, it is, as I have just said, not necessarily proof
of a wrongful police attitude which merits judicial rebuke. It may
be activity which the judges should commend and assist.
The arrests without conviction, to which I have referred, divide
themselves into three general classes.
The first and perhaps the largest class is that in which conviction
cannot be had because the police have no evidence on which to con
vict. The arrests for window-tapping, of which I have spoken, fall
within this class. There is no evidence of crime, because of the
judicial decision that window-tapping is not a crime. Even Judge
Cotter's ruling that it is a crime required the police to prove con
clusively that the defendant actually did the tapping. Now these
women sit in a darkened room, or behind a lace curtain in the day
time, where they can see, but not be seen. There may be two or
four women in the house. All the police can know is that some one
of them tapped. Only in rare instances can they really know which
one did it. Even under Judge Cotter's ruling, therefore, they can
seldom convict a tapper.
The same thing is true of the arrests of street-walkers for solici
tation. Even the plain-clothes officers are known to street women.
I have seen a prostitute suddenly leave a "prospect" and slip into a
hotel because she recognized the police flivver over a block away.
On the other hand, I have watched a clean-up squad make almost
thirty arrests of prostitutes in one evening without a single mistake.
I mean by "without mistake", that every one of the women sooner or
later admitted that she was a prostitute, or had been "hustling" the
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day before, or expected to be able to do so tomorrow, and merely
insisted that she was not hustling at the particular time. But in
not a single one of these cases did the officers really have evidence
of actual solicitating sufficient to make out a case. They simply
cannot get such evidence.
This means that the police of a big city have just two alternatives.
They may let window-tapping go on unchecked, and let the prostitutes
walk the streets when and where they will, except for the very rare
cases when they can get the evidence. You know about what the
city would be like, if the police did that. The alternative is to hold
prostitution in check to some extent, by making the prostitutes at least
keep under cover, through these arrests which admittedly cannot be
successfully prosecuted. The point is, that as a necessary means of
keeping the city clean, these arrests are really justified in fact, so far
as the police are concerned, and the police should not be condemned
by the judges.
The second class of apparently unjustified arrests comprises those ,
in which the police really have sufficient evidence to convict, but are
unable to persuade the judge or jury of its truth. I doubt if there
are many cases of this type, though the papers herald the few that
do come up out of all proportion to their importance.
It is a delicate matter to say that the police ever really have suffi
cient evidence, when the judge or a jury has said otherwise, but I
am sure that it happens.
I watched one series of cases which seemed rather convincing.
I had been with the police of a certain city when they made the
arrests, and I heard the cases tried by the judge without a jury.
These were the facts, as I observed them.
The police had received several anonymous reports that a cer
tain house was being operated as a blind-pig. There was not enough
evidence to satisfy the magistrate issuing search warrants, but enough
notoriety attached to the place to bring public condemnation on the
police if they did not do what they could to put an end to it. So
being unable to get a warrant, they raided it without one.
It was a blind pig of the lowest type— incredibly dirty, not as the
old saloons used to be, sociably dirty for those who liked it
,
but
bare, ugly, and forlornly sordid. Of course, there was no use in
arresting the negro proprietor, who wore diamonds and an evil grin
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on top of his dirt and who knew his legal rights. There were a
dozen men in the place, dirty, unshaven bums, and a few workmea
I was brought up and went to school in one of the poorest districts
of the city, and I have some sense of the difference between a dirty
workman and a dirty bum.
They were lined up and quizzed by the officers. Those who had
no job, no money, no address were held on a charge of vagrancy,
and the others were let go.
Later on that evening the same officers picked up four bums,
more or less drunk, loitering where they had no business to be, and
where I should not have cared to meet them alone. The drunkest of
the lot was one Eddie Murphy. Before Eddie's case came on, his
record was looked up and showed, as I now remember it, 23 ap
pearances in court in two years. More of his time seemed to have
been spent in the House than on the streets. A third arrest that same
evening by the same officers was made, for prostitution.
The first case of this particular batch to be called in court was
one of the loafers arrested on the street corner with Eddie Murphy.
The judge inquired of Officer Monahan (which was not his name)
about the circumstances, quizzed the defendant and sent him to the
House. The next case was one of the vagrants from the blind pig.
Monahan reported where he had found the fellow, that he had no
money, and that he had admitted not having worked at all for four
or five weeks. The judge then questioned the defendant, who said
he was a married man, living with his wife, and had not worked
because he could not get a job.
Personally, I am inclined to think the fellow really was a sort of
worthless ne'er-do-well, who liked liquor, rather than a real vagrant
such as the law is aimed at. But on the other hand, I cannot see
that the officer made a very serious mistake in picking him up, under
the circumstances. However, the judge thought otherwise. As soon
as the fellow told his story, the judge, with no further inquiry at all,
burst out into a tirade of abuse at the officer and the police in gen
eral. It was a surprising show of temper. Although the release of
the prisoner impressed me as proper, the condemnation of the
officer seemed very unjust.
The next case was that of Eddie Murphy. One of Eddie's com
panions, you remember, had already been sentenced, and Eddie's
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record had been handed to the judge, though I am not sure he had
read it. The judge, however, when the case was called, turned to
Monahan and asked, "is this another one of your cases?" "Yes",
said Monahan. "Case dismissed", said the judge, "get out of here
Murphy". There, certainly, was a case where the court ignored evi
dence sufficient to convict. He had already held it sufficient in the
case of Eddie's companion.
In the prostitution case which came up next there was evidence
enough to lead me to convict the woman, had I been the court, but
the court itself thought otherwise and dismissed the case. I feel
quite sure that had he not been angry at Monahan, he would have
found the woman guilty.
The third class of apparently unjustified arrests, comprises the
cases where the police have sufficient evidence to convict, but are
forbidden by judicial ruling to use it. These are the cases chiefly
where the evidence has been secured by search without a warrant.
Michigan is one of the minority of states, where evidence illeg
ally secured must be returned or suppressed on demand of the per
son whose rights have been violated. Consequently evidence secured
by illegal search or arrest cannot be used over such protest. This
is, of course, merely an indirect method of sustaining the constitu
tional immunity from search, by refusing to allow even the state
to profit by its violation. Mr. Wigmore expresses it as an attempt
to punish the officer for his wrongdoing by refusing to punish some
one else. The merit or harmfulness of this indirect method is a moot
matter which I shall not now discuss.
The point here important is
,
that even though the rule ex
cluding such evidence be established, there still remains a certain
judicial discretion in applying the rule— a chance to co-operate with
the enforcement agencies, or to obstruct and hinder their work,
whichever the judge may choose.
Some trial courts seem even to ignore the rule altogether, some
how, when they conceive that the interest of society require it to be
ignored. Take two similar cases as illustration.
The police got complaints that one Bill Flockton was running a
blind pig. The complaints were not such, however, that they could
secure a search warrant. So they went to the place without it
,
a
couple at the front door, and one at the back. They knocked and
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demanded entrance, in the name of the law. The door was opened,
and Bill and his considerable quantity of booze—which he had hidden
in a closet—were loaded into the wagon and taken to the station.
The next complaint on the list was of an apartment said to be
occupied by a prostitute. Again there was no evidence on which
to get out a warrant, but again the officers went to front and back
doors and demanded entrance. Again they entered despite Letty's
protest and searched and again they found the evidence hidden in a
closet. The fellow admitted having had intercourse for which he had
paid. So Letty and the evidence were bundled into the wagon and
sent to the station.
There was not a shadow of difference in the material facts of the
two cases. The unwarranted invasion of privacy was identical.
Nevertheless, Bill was discharged on the ground that the evidence
had been secured by illegal search, and Letty drew thirty days in the
house of correction.
The only possible explanation I can see, is that the trial courts
are willing to co-operate with the police in overcoming practical diffi
culties in the prevention of prostitution, but do not so co-operate in
respect to prohibition. If the objection to the use of the evidence
had been raised by counsel in Letty's case, it is probable the court
would have heeded it. The difference seems to be that in the pro
hibition cases the objection is raised by the judge himself, although
he does not raise it himself in the prostitution cases.
(Not all trial judges so co-operate, even in prostitution matters,
however. I am told,—though I cannot verify it^that one judge has
said that evidence of prostitution secured without a warrant cannot
be used, unless the act itself took place in the presence of the officer
making the arrest. And I believe such is really the law.)
But even assuming that evidence secured by illegal search can
never properly be used in any such cases, a search does not always
need to be on a warrant, to be perfectly legal. Thus, if it is reas
onable without a warrant, a warrant is not necessary. While the
Supreme Court was holding that search of a barn for liquor, on a
warrant authorizing search of a house, was not legal, the circuit court
was holding, on the same day, that search of a barn for diseased
cattle was reasonable and therefore legal, without any warrant at all.
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What is reasonable and legal seems to be a matter of judicial reaction
to the facts.
Similarly, it is perfectly well settled that after a legal arrest,
search of the person arrested may be made without a warrant.
Furthermore, an arrest for felony is quite lawful, even without a
warrant, if made upon reasonable ground for believing the arestee
guilty.
What constitutes reasonable ground to believe the arrestee guilty
is a matter for the judge to decide in each case, when the facts are
clear. Therefore, if the judge feels that the arrest is legal, the sub
sequent search is legal, even without a warrant, and the evidence may
be used. If he thinks the arrest itself was unreasonable, the evi
dence cannot be used. It is up to the judge. As a matter of law,
it is within his judgment in such cases, whether the evidence may
be used or not. One judge, therefore, may co-operate with the police
by readily believing that reasonable ground for belief existed, while
another may oppose the policy by inability ever to see reasonable
grounds.
Judges do not always decide alike upon this matter. For instance,
two officers patrolling in a dangerous part of town noticed a negro
and a Mexican wandering about suspiciously. As the pair saw the
officers they started to turn around, thought better of it and came
on. An officer stopped the negro, took him by the shoulder, and
felt his hip pocket. In it was a steel jimmy about two feet long.
As this officer turned to speak to his companion, he saw the Mexican
drawing a thirty -two calibre automatic. They took it away from
him and sent both men to the station. Both were indicted for carry
ing concealed weapons. The negro, with the steel bar, came up for
trial first and drew ninety days in the house of correction. The
Mexican, with the automatic, came up later before a different judge,
who dismissed the case and discharged the Mexican on the ground
that the arrest and search were illegal.
It is obvious that both judges could not have been right, since the
facts of the two cases were identical. Yet, it is hard to show which
was wrong. One had faith in the police, the other was hostile. The
grounds of suspicion are almost impossible to demonstrate to a
hostile judge in such cases. If an officer cannot arrest for carrying
concealed weapons unless he actually sees the weapon, he cannot
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arrest at all, for in such cases the weapon is not concealed. It would
mean that the law against carrying concealed weapons might as well
be repealed. If an officer may arrest on reasonable suspicion, then
he ought not, as a practical matter, be required to paint for the judge
a picture of all the little events, the furtiveness of the suspect, the
quick motion for his hip when he is startled, and all the other de
tails, so clearly that the judge himself can visualize it and himself
realize the suspicion. Did you ever hear of a policeman clever
enough to paint a word picture like that? If he were, he would be a
councilman at least, not a flat-foot.
I cannot see the possible justice in denying the reasonableness of
the officer's suspicions, when they do, in fact, lead him to arrest the
guilty man. Guilt tends to reveal itself. The fact that the person
arrested is in fact guilty of the crime for which he was arrested is
to me the strongest evidence that the arresting officer had reasonable
ground to believe him guilty.




"To Lieut. in Charge,
"Sir, at about 11 :40 P. M. on the night of April 21, 1923.
while Patr. Clyde Rittenhouse, and myself were walking
north on Orleans St., near Maple St., we noticed a colored
man walking towards us, and upon noticing us, he stopped,
and seemed to us, that he was undecided whether to keep on
coming toward us or run the other way. Upon coming closer
to him his actions prompted me to say, 'just a moment, Mac'
At the same moment he drew a gun from his right overcoat
pocket. and started to shoot at me. He fired four shots, one
of the bullets hitting me in the left leg breaking the shin
bone. We returned the fire, hitting him five times. I was
transferred to Receiving Hospital in Auto No. 3. On Sept.
5, 1923, Patr. Rittenhouse and myself, with Det. Carscadden
and Jankow, went to court, where we found out that the case
against Oliver Phelps, the man who shot me, had been dis
missed the previous day by Judge Edward Jeffries. The
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Judge declaring that it had been an unlawful search, as we
had molested a peaceful citizen on his way home, and under
the circumstances, he had a perfect right to shoot me.
Respectfully submitted,
(Signed) Walter Stelt, Pair.
First Endorsement
From the Commanding Officer, Third Precinct, to the
Superintendent of Police, June 5th, 1924. For your infor
mation.
(Signed) Lou1s L. Berg, Inspt.
Third Precinct Station.
The official records show the dismissal, but do not show the
reason. If the judge really held as stated, his conclusions were ab
solutely incorrect as a matter of law. Even granting that the arrest
was illegal, Phelps had no legal right to shoot the officer.
Moreover, whatever the judge may think, the facts show that
Phelps was not a peaceful citizen. He was in fact a law-breaker, a
criminal. He was in fact committing the very offense for which he
was arrested. Remember that these officers were in uniform.
Phelps had no pretense of believing that it was a hold up, or anything
of the sort. To say, under the circumstances, that the officers had no
reason to suspect the facts, seems obviously —let us say a marked
failure to co-operate with the police.
Other cases of the same type occur so often that I expect some
day to see the legislature step in and declare that the actual guilt of a
person arrested shall be sufficient proof that the arrest itself is
reasonable, if otherwise legally effected.
Since the courts possess this discretion to say that the arrest is
justified and the search legal, they have power to co-operate or not
to co-operate as they see fit. The cases I have just cited show the
extent to which they choose the latter alternative.
In another aspect of non co-operation, I know of one police court
judge, who so persistently refused to punish gun-toters arrested by
the police that, after several murders of policemen, the press began
to condemn him. He then took action not, however, by co-operating
with the police, but by organizing an "anti-gun-toting league" among
the negroes and roughs of the city. Each member pledged himself
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not to carry concealed weapons in violation of the law. It was a
lovely ideal, this altruistic plan of putting crooks on their honor.
But I have a suspicion that it did more to keep that judge on the
bench than it helped the police to repress robbery and assault.
The result of all this non-co-operation seems to me to be bad.
It makes for inevitable increase of crime. In the first place it derog
ates that certainty of punishment which is admittedly the strongest
factor in deterring crime. It leads to an exaggerated belief in the
facility with which one may escape punishment. It creates a feeling
that "influence" can assure escape. Moreover, it diminishes seriously
the under-world's natural fear of the police, and affects the whole
country's respect for law and law enforcement.
On the other hand, instead of lessening illegal and unwarranted
police activity, it necessarily increases such activity. The police can
not arrest without a warrant; they cannot get a warrant without
evidence ; they are too well known to get such evidence as is necessary
for a warrant without search; and they cannot search for the evi
dence without a warrant—which brings us back to the beginning.
It seems to be impracticable to get evidence against the smaller and
most dangerous of the blind pigs and gambling joints, and more
particularly against the gun-toters and their ilk, by so-called legiti
mate means.
The result is that for a time the police obey the law, as it is in
terpreted by the courts (which is not the way it is literally written)
and they leave alone the secretive and furtive offenders. But when
complaints become chronic, and the papers howl about police ineffi
ciency, there comes a point when they must act. Then they must
disregard judicial rulings and are forced to harass the prostitutes
and bootleggers, gun-toters and gamblers, in whatever way possible.
Under our judicial rulings they cannot practically, actually convict
these gentry and put them into safe seclusion. If they could, our
cities would be cleaner of vice.
Likewise our police officers would be somewhat safer in the per
formance of duty, and our own selves less liable to armed robbery,
if thugs and criminals actually armed and ready to use their guns,
were not called peaceful citizens, and if officers were not required
to prove in detail the reasonableness of their undeniably correct
suspicions.
CO-OPERATION— JUDICIARY AND POLICE *285
Let me emphasize at this point that I am not ignorant of the
other side of the matter. I know that law enforcement officers do
abuse their authority. I have seen it myself. Every man who has
been arrested for anything thinks he has seen it
,
but I have seen
abuse when I was not the one abused, but only an unprejudiced
observer.
I know there is much truth in the statement of Judge Anderson
of the first federal circuit. He said (294 Fed. 776, 790) "Lawless
ness by law enforcing agents, cuts up to the roots of government
— . For years, if not permanently, we shall inevitably have
a larger number of policemen or prohibition officers, however they
be named, unfit for their jobs—either out and out blackmailers, or
ready to yield to the temptation of bribery."
But after all, the real remedy is direct action against these uni
formed bruisers and blackmailers; the same remedy that would be
used were they not in uniform. We cannot discard our police because
its units are not perfect. We have not prohibited the manufacture
of cards and dice because some men use them to cheat and deceive.
Neither do we condemn the use of automobiles because some men
use them for the purpose of facilitating crime. Instead, we punish
the criminal users directly, so far as we practically can. Thus also
we should deal with faulty units of the police forces.
I feel sure that the misuse of enforcement power, the asserted
danger to private rights, the alleged impracticability of checking it by
direct action, are very greatly exaggerated. All that sort of thing is
first rate press stuff. We like to hear government abused, rather
than praised ; so the press gives it to us. Last year a Detroit police
man got drunk and beat up his wife. Immediately a reporter was at
headquarters demanding details and a picture. The head of the de
partment offered instead the inside story of a policeman who had
just, single-handed, made a very courageous arrest of two stick-up
men. The reporter, however, refused to consider the latter story of
.bravery and efficiency; he insisted on the drunkenness case because
it made so much more interesting news. Of course it was in truth
the more unusual occurrence. It is just that natural public attitude,
however, which makes enforcement misdeeds seem worse than they
really are.
Mr. Edmund Pearson (Studies in Murder, p. 206) has expressed
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this well, though in a different connection. He was speaking of
difficulties which the prosecution of crime encounters and said,
"One of the reasons why murder is not an extra-hazardous
crime in the United States is that by the time the
accused person is brought before a jury the horror felt at the
crime has faded and disappeared. The prisoner has become
the center of a pity often quite misplaced. It is then easy for
newspapers which are edited for semi-intelligent persons with
maudlin sympathies to represent the accused man as the vic
tim of persecution by the police, who during the trial are aided
by one or two remorseless attorneys for the government."
He goes on to say, "It is rare, in any conspicuous murder trial, if
the attorney for the people does not find himself assailed as a public
enemy, merely because he is faithful to his trust."
I think this emotional sentiment for the criminal and this instinc
tive opposition to any governmental limitations upon free action, are
behind most of the belief that law enforcement agencies are a poten
tial menace to society.
Now, as I said at the beginning, if I seem to place undue emphasis
upon the hole in the doughnut, it is not because I cannot see the
doughnut as a whole. I do see the dough, and I appreciate its
quality. I have not spoken of the high character of our American
judiciary and the wholly admirable way in which our judges are
performing their functions, only because I was not asked to talk of
that. Every one appreciates our judges, and comment on their abil
ities would be superfluous.
I was asked to comment only on the minor detail of their non-
co-operation with the police, that is
,
with the law enforcement agen
cies. Assuming that in the main they do co-operate, I have merely
pointed out the occasional failure. But while that refusal to co
operate is occasional only, it is none the less important in the success
or failure of our social organization. Society would be better served
in the long run if co-operation were closer.
Let me repeat that I am not here to praise the police. They make
just as many mistakes and commit as many faults as other men. I
insist that we should go after them hard and should punish their
misdeeds as we punish all wrongdoing. But whatever the enforce
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ment agencies may do, I believe the courts will not well serve the
public if they merely say to the police, "We don't like you. we are
distrustful of you, you make many mistakes, therefore we will refuse
to believe that you had reasonable cause to arrest even though your
man was guilty, we will abuse you in open court before the public, we
will tell the world that you are incompetent and officious ; in short,
we don't approve of you and therefore we will make your work of
protecting society as difficult as possible."
That is the attitude of some of our judges, and I believe it is
wrong.
Viewing the facts of both sides so far as I have been able to
learn them and judging without personal prejudice, I feel sure that
a greater public good would result if our courts would give up the
idea that two wrongs make it right for both wrongdoers to go un
punished. It hurts the police perhaps, but it does not punish them
so much as it injures the public. The better course for the courts,
would be to facilitate direct punishment of anyone, be he policeman
or civilian, who trespasses upon the legal rights of others, and to
punish every criminal as his crime deserves.
1925 BAR ASSOCIATION MEETING
While all final arrangements for the 1925 meeting of the Michi
gan State Bar Association have not been completed, because of the
desirability of making the State Association program fit in with
that of the American Bar Association, most of the necessary informa
tion concerning the meeting can now be given.
The conference of Bar delegates will meet September first. The
first general meeting of the American Bar Association will be on
Wednesday morning, September 2, at which time President Hughes
will deliver his presidential address. On the afternoon of September
2 there will be a joint meeting of the Michigan State Bar Associa
tion and the American Bar Association at which President Walter S.
Foster, of the Michigan State Bar Association will preside. The
program for this meeting will be announced later. The business
meeting of the State Bar Association will be held on September 3,
